

VALÉRIE AMIRAUX

Academic Discourses on Islam(s) in France and Germany: Producing Knowledge or Reproducing Norms?

“Science, in short, influences the way politics is done”.
Ernst Haas, *When Knowledge is Power*

Introduction

While delivering the Annual Lecture at the Institute for the Study of Islam (ISIM) in the Modern World (ISIM) on 15 March 2000, Professor Gudrun Krämer concludes her talk by saying: “The study of Islam is a joint-venture. We all share the risks and the benefits—and the doubts”.¹ In this chapter, I wish to adopt this statement applying it to the specific situation related to the production of public discourses on Islam in Europe, and more specifically in France and Germany. The presence of Muslims in Europe is commonly perceived thanks to the media as difficult and problematique, being regularly emphasized on the occasion of crisis such as terrorist attacks or civil war in the Middle-Eastern scenes. However, the building of a so-called Muslim community as a social problem too often constitutes the point of departure as well as the concluding reflections on Islam in Europe, being integrated in comments made by International Relations specialists² or experts of migration.³ The result is an academic discourse, ignorant of the lived reality of the events it seeks to explain, “Islam” being a catchword mixing its perception as religion, faith, political resource, culture, etc.

1 G. Krämer, “On Difference and Understanding: The Use and Abuse of the Study of Islam,” in: *ISIM Newsletter*, 5 (2000), pp. 6 f.

2 B. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, Berkeley 1998.

3 C. Joppke (ed.), *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*, Oxford 1998.

Taking these remarks as starting statement, this text tackles the production of discourses on Islam in Western Europe and focuses in particular on how is the structure of scientific visions of Islam in France and Germany constructed? In a second step, it intends to deal with the special ties that bind politics and academia in Europe and the epistemological background Islamic studies are rooted in.

The role of epistemic communities, defined by P. Haas as „a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”⁴ is at the core of this analysis aspiring to assess to growing relevance of expertise in the field of Islamic studies in Europe. Indeed, in order to ameliorate the uncertainties, understand the current issues and anticipate future evolution, policy-makers use more and more specific competences of specialists in every kind of domains, immigration and its religious aspects being two of them. In that sense, it appears legitimate to screen the way in which the social sciences perspective observing Islam in Europe can perfectly well respond to the political expectations of what Islam should be. Research, to a certain extent, is also the response to a political and social demand (of information, analysis, dates, statistics, expertise needed for instance for trial or courts decision)⁵. The degree of knowledge and the very specific ties binding academics and politics in this matter act as limits and attempt to control the production of narratives.⁶ This is particularly significant and visible on the occasion of crisis such as the Gulf War in 1991. Until the publication of an important survey showing the contrary, the media provided a frightening discourse trying to associate Muslims and Arabs living in French suburbs with a supposed international

Islamic solidarity towards Saddam Hussein.⁷ At the same time (in February 1991), *Der Spiegel* published an article following a similar perspective, underlining the calm among Muslims in Germany that was very different from their “brothers in France and Morocco who support very warmly the Iraqi dictator S. Hussein and blame the American president G. Bush.”⁸

The “taken-for-granted” anti-Muslims discourse as an „ingredient of the commonsense world of millions of people every day”⁹ is not only exclusive property of the tabloid press but is also routinely diffused in the general press and commonly linked to migration or violence issues. In February 1998, *Le Monde* explicitly linked religious rites and practices of a specific population with social violence.¹⁰ In Germany, *Der Spiegel* and *Focus*, weekly magazines, regularly play with the representation of foreigners, most of the time symbolised by a photo of a veiled woman, and the religious identification.¹¹ The manipulation of meanings—not being however the only speciality of journalists¹²—is commonly diffused in society and linked to the respective social closures which are, on the one hand in Germany the concepts of citizenship and loyalty, and on the other hand in France, the exclusive submission to the Republican ideal.¹³ The same type of population

7 Among the first personalities quoted as “most favored one”: F. Mitterrand (67 %), S. Hussein (26 %) was far behind. Sondage: *Les musulmans et la guerre du Golfe*, February 1991.

8 *Der Spiegel*, 8/91, pp. 95-97.

9 Report of the Runnymede Trust-Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, *Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All*, The Runnymede Trust 1997, p. 10.

10 “La fin du Ramadan est marquée par des incidents,” in: *Le Monde*, 27 février 1998.

11 *Der Spiegel* (June 1997), in: *Focus* (September, 1997).

12 On this issue, see Didier Bigo’s study of European security and police. Considered as one of the permanent threat for a European security together with drugs, the so-called “organised-crime,” Islam is inheriting the double-sided role of internal and external enemy carried by migration waves. D. Bigo, *Polices en réseaux*, Paris, FNSP: 1996.

13 Here appears heuristic the reference to the idea of “abstract universalism” as developed by Khosrokhavar: “Ce modèle culturel normé qui régit l’espace public français où les manifestations du particularisme relèvent en théorie du privé et où l’espace public est réservé aux revendications politiques ‘pures’”. F. Khosrokhavar, “L’universel abstrait, le politique et la construction de l’islamisme comme forme d’altérité,” in: M. Wiewiorka (ed.), *Une société fragmentée? Le multiculturalisme en débat*, Paris 1996, p. 114.

4 P. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” in: *International Organization*, 46 (I) (1992), p. 3.

5 See on this specific connection between the academic expertise and the political use of it, O. Roy, “Les islamologues ont-ils inventé l’islamisme?,” in: *Esprit*, août-septembre 2001, pp. 116-138.

6 As pointed out by Norbert Elias, the dilemma for social scientists and especially for sociologists is linked to the difficulty of their scientific duty with the requirements resulting from their position as members of other groups: „Comment séparer, en évitant équivoque et contradiction, leurs deux fonctions, celle de participant et celle de chercheur?” N. Elias, *Engagement et distanciation*, Paris 1993, p. 29.

(young Muslims born and educated in the host-countries where their parents/grand-parents decided to migrate) in France and Germany are not systematically designed as victims and labelled as dangerous in identical forms, the process of ethnicisation of the social actors mainly meaning “muslimisation” in France and, until recently, “kurdisation” in Germany.¹⁴

In this chapter, I choose to concentrate on two national contexts, the German and the French ones, as they are facing different types of scientific and political attitudes towards Islam settled on their territory. Basically, a French plethora of knowledge about Islam in France since the 90s—going beyond the quasi monopoly by political scientists during the 80s¹⁵—has to be compared to the quasi absence of sociology and political science’s production on this topic in Germany until very recently and in particular Heitmeyer’s empirical study of young Muslims commitment into Turkish Islamic and nationalist associations in Germany (see my critical comments below). In brief, while Islam became a kind of “public enemy n°1” in France, it remained mainly a “Hinterhofkultur” in Germany, being differently embedded in a historical oedipal complexity.¹⁶ In fact, for both countries, working on Islam means usually to be the victim of what I characterise as a “parasitical” memory-effect.¹⁷ To some extent, the memory reflects long-term souvenirs, facing a former enemy today being on the territory

14 On this aspect, see B. Dupret, “Qualifier, disqualifier; de la fonction des mots dans le discours sur l’Autre arabo-musulman,” in: Espace Arabesque (ed.), *La Peur et la séduction: l’autre dans l’imaginaire occidental et arabo-musulman*, Bruxelles 1992. This leads us to the problem of the meaning of citizenship and its disconnection from any kind of dimension of identification: „l’identité citoyenne est toujours concurrencée par ces identités poussant à la différenciation et la division que sont la classe, l’ethnicité, la religion et la famille, la citoyenneté n’est plus [...] une identité fondamentale ou fondatrice.” J. Leca, “La démocratie à l’épreuve des pluralismes,” in: *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 46 (2): 1996, p. 261.

15 J. Cesari, “L’islam dans l’immigration: un bilan de la recherche,” in: *La pensée*, 299, juillet-septembre 1994, pp. 59-67.

16 When Algeria was a French department, Algerians were not automatically considered as French citizens. They had to apply for it and to renounce Islam as religion.

17 As M. Rodinson reminds us, Islam was a partner before becoming an enemy. M. Rodinson, *La fascination de l’islam. Les étapes du regard occidental sur le monde musulman*, Paris 1980.

(Crusaders, colony, Empire, national independence of former colonies, etc.). For other observers, the memory is defined in the short-term while seeing secularisation (institutionalisation) as the only frame of incorporation of the minority religion. The colonial and post-colonial attitude of France towards North Africa is not the only explanatory factor.¹⁸ Opposed to this bifurcation of the scientific attitudes towards Islam as subject of study, one of the most important variable to be mentioned here concerns the similar evolution of Islam in Germany and France among youngsters (distance towards their parent’s traditions, habits, superstitions, individualisation-privatization of the references, claim for visibility, social mobility) as opposed to the growing gap in the political and social problematization of Islam between the two countries.¹⁹ Trying to overcome the archetypal opposition „jus sanguinis versus jus soli” overused in German and French comparative works, I argue that Islam and nationality-citizenship arguments have similar functions and position in the migration debate in each country.

Setting the research-agenda:

Studying Islam in French and German contexts

Religion, as basically all objects of social sciences, cannot be considered neutral, and this is not peculiar to Islam. Moreover, in the specific case of Islam, scholars can only with difficulty adopt moderate or soft positions since migration, terrorism, fanaticism and Islam remain strongly associated with security issues by politicians, police, journalists and public opinion.²⁰ Furthermore, in this kind of “dangerous fieldwork,”²¹

18 North-African migrants represent the first group of Muslims in France. For some of the first and for the second-third generations, to become French can be interpreted as a betrayal of those who fought the French enemy.

19 On Germany, see V. Amiraux, *Acteurs de l’islam entre Allemagne et Turquie. Parcours militants et expériences religieuses*, Paris, L’Harmattan: 2001; on France, see F. Khosrokhavar, *L’islam des jeunes*, Paris 1997 and J. Cesari, *Musulmans et républicains*, Paris 1998.

20 D. Bigo, *Polices en réseaux*, op.cit.

21 R. Lee, *Dangerous Fieldwork*, Thousand Oaks 1995.

the loyalty of the researcher is also addressed by the scepticism of his/her own colleagues arguing that if you are not against it, you are necessarily in favour of it.²² Being assigned the position of observer, escaping the „tourist's hasty generalisations" should be then seen as the first epistemological step, which does not imply the transparency of the expert,²³ but more an incentive to work in terms of „implicit comparison" as Nancy L. Green referred to: "The migrant embodies an implicit comparison between past and present, between one world and another, between two languages, and two sets of cultural norms."²⁴ This is particularly relevant in the case of France where Islam cannot be seen out of the dogmatic instruction of the French *laïcité* having consequences on the epistemological situation of academics writing on Islam.²⁵

In the French context, "the three monotheisms suffer a common fate and are relatively marginalised [...] in terms of the central sociological debate (either because so little work is produced, because priority is given to scholarship or because religion-as-object is dissolved into

22 "[...] toute présomption de cette complicité avec l'objet contre laquelle le chercheur doit lutter en tout état de cause invalidait ipso facto le projet même d'en rendre compte scientifiquement. Pour prendre légitimement la religion comme objet de son investigation, le sociologue devait en permanence donner des gages du fait qu'il n'accordait aucune consistance propre à la vision religieuse du monde contre laquelle, précisément, l'interprétation sociologique devait se construire." D. Hervieu-Léger, "De l'utopie à la tradition: retour sur une trajectoire de recherche," in: Y. Lambert, G. Michelat, A. Piette (eds.), *Le religieux des sociologues. Trajectoires personnelles et débats scientifiques*, Paris 1997, pp. 21-31: p. 22.

23 E. Morawska, *The New-Old Transmigrants, their Transnational Lives, and Ethnification: A Comparison of 19th/20th and 20th/21st Centuries Situations*, Florence 1999 (WP309).

24 N. L. Green, "The Comparative Method and Poststructuralist Structuralism: New Perspectives for Migration Studies," in: J. & L. Lucassen (eds), *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, Bern 1997, pp. 57-72: p. 57.

25 "Il existe en France, et surtout dans l'Université, un tabou souvent outre-passé, mais sur le mode de l'insulte ou du soupçon, à propos des convictions religieuses, personnelles, intimes des producteurs intellectuels [...]. Ce tabou est le prix de la laïcité, mais c'est aussi une rançon. Car il a pour conséquence d'occulter des questions très simples sur le lien entre rapport au thème religion en général [...], et rapport à la religion—propre, personnelle, de celui qui écrit." F. Colonna, "L'islam, la théorie de la religion et l'impensé du champ académique français," in: Y. Lambert, G. Michelat, A. Piette (eds.), *Le religieux des sociologues. Trajectoires personnelles et débats scientifiques*, Paris 1997, pp. 197-205: 197.

culture)."²⁶ On this peculiar purpose, F. Colonna evokes the cost of French *laïcité* in relationship with the persistent absence of a French sociology of religion of Islam and the absence of emerging paradigms.²⁷ Beginning by examining a bibliographical survey of work on the science of religions, she notices the quasi exclusively descriptive dimension of publications dealing with Islam. In fact, the main conclusion to be drawn emphasises the centrality of Christianity in the conceptualisation of religion as social construct: "the question of Islam as an object of science is inseparable from the question of the birth of a science of religions in the nineteenth century".²⁸ Escaping the management by the "islamologues," the scientific production on Islam in France remains highly dominated by the political scientists initially working on the Middle-East and the Maghreb who opportunely changed their area of investigation during the 80s.²⁹ Dubet and others underline the fact that in France, Islam does not belong to the field of migration studies as it could have been the case following the work in terms of identity.³⁰ It is to a certain extent of no surprise that religion does not appear as one of the aspects to be dealt with as far as migrants are concerned. From the end of the fifties to the seventies, social sciences express a growing disinterest for this topic, either perceived as sentenced to death or to lose its social significance. The radical change in the perception of the centrality of religion in analysing the positions of migrants cannot be thought without reference to the parallel evolution of scholars working on the Middle-East. During the 70s and the 80s, they face the emergence of new actors on the political regional scenes, trying to articulate the

26 Ibid., see also F. Colonna, "Islam in the French Sociology of Religion," *Economy and Society*, Londres, 24, 2: 1995, pp. 225-244: 235.

27 F. Colonna, "L'islam, la théorie de la religion ...," op. cit.

28 F. Colonna, "Islam in the French Sociology of Religion," p. 227.

29 J. Cesari, "L'islam dans l'immigration: un bilan de la recherche," op. cit.; A. Roussillon, *Déclin de l'islamisme ou panne conceptuelle du néo-orientalisme? En finir avec l'exception islamique*, Mediterranean Programme Working Papers, Florence (EUI/RSCAS): 2001/10.

30 F. Dubet, *Immigrations—qu'en savons nous? Un bilan des connaissances*, Paris 1989; V. Amiraux, "L'immigration dans la recherche française. Bilan des études menées en France depuis 1990," in: *European Journal of International Migration and Ethnic Relations*, 1/27 (1995), pp. 81-107.

legitimacy of the political powers with religion. The social science production on Islam in France discovers the added value of an interpretation including religion in the picture by focusing on the new visibility of claim-making by migrants organisation in which religion appears as one of the main argument. Basically, until the beginning of the 90s and in particular the publication of the book co-written by F. Gaspard and F. Khosrokhavar analysing various discourses on the veil produced by young Muslim women, the publications dealing with Islam and Muslims settled in France analyses this complex reality mainly in terms of supply and demand, in particular on the basis of study of organisational and associative networks.³¹ It is after the turn of the 90s, that the social scientists including sociologists and anthropologists started rendering the diversity and the complexity of the object "Islam in France," even entering into a kind of self-reflexive analysis and in particular trying to deconstruct the "natural" connection between migration and Islam.³² This second trend of literature by social scientists on Islam in France can be characterised by the variety of disciplines it encompasses, and by the larger theoretical frameworks they use, in particular anchored in the sociology of religion, the mobilisation of resources analysis and the new social movements theory. However, this new type of specialists of Islam in France pops up at a moment of extreme radicalisation and stigmatisation of religious practices by the public opinion, more specifically in relation with the various discussions on the veils at school.

In Germany, basically until the end of the 1980s, the study of religious practices and discourses of Muslims remains either considered as part of the migration spectrum of analysis, or as entering the competence of Orientalists mainly thanks to ethnographic studies conducted by

anthropologists. From 1973–1974 to 1990, the knowledge of Islam among migrants in Germany can be divided into four types of investigation. The first derives from the "orientalist" point of view and from the construction of a *Feindbild Islam*. The lack of scientific exhaustive publications concerning immigrants' Islam was the rule until the stigmatisation arising from the discourses of the so-called "Panikmacher"—the panic makers—, false experts monopolising the media arena from the Gulf War onwards.³³ The second category of publications on Islam among migrants is the one of the "practitioners," involved in social organisations, trade-unions, churches, that is to say those who took care of migrants until the German government decided to institutionalise an *Ausländerbeauftragte* in 1978. Third is the category of actors of Islamic field in Germany. There are mainly Turks or Germans converted to Islam. This is the most well documented literature on the subject, even if it remains often one-sided.³⁴ Last but not least, social scientists contributed also to this production. Here again, the disparity and the monographic aspects of these studies do not give any exhaustive view of the situation of Muslims on a federal level. The most interesting studies were conducted by ethnologists or anthropologists taking Islam as one variable,³⁵ but not as central point and, as in

33 One of those so-called „false experts" is G. Konzmann. See the anecdote in the foreword of *Die Zeit*: „So wachsen sie heran, die türkischen Kinder zwischen Koran, Kismet und Coca-Cola (nebenbei: ein Klasse-Titel für den nächsten Konzmann-Report)." Jörg Albrecht, *Die Zeit*, n°51, 12.12.97.

34 M. Gür, *Türkische-islamische Vereinigungen in der BRD*, Frankfurt am Main, Brandes & Apsel, 1993; E. Özcan, *Türkische Immigrantensorganisationen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin 1989.

35 W. Schiffauer, "Religion und Identität. Eine Fallstudie zum Problem der Reislamisierung bei Arbeitsmigranten," in: *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, Vol. 10, Nr. 2, 1984, pp. 485–516; W. Schiffauer, "Islamischer Fundamentalismus—Zur Konstruktion des Radikal Anderen," in: *Neue Politische Literatur. Berichte über das internationale Schrifttum* 1, 1995, pp. 95–105; W. Schiffauer, "Auf dem Weg zum Gottesstaat. Die fundamentalistischen Gemeinden türkischer Arbeitsmigranten in der Bundesrepublik," in: *Historische Anthropologie*, 1. Jg., 1993, Heft 3, pp. 468–484; see also B. Wolbert, "Pass und Passagen. Ethnologische Konzepte in der Migrationsforschung," in: *Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaft* (Themenheft: *Ethnologie der Migration*), 10, 1997, pp. 49–71, and *Der getötete Paß: Arbeitsmigration und Rückkehr in die Türkei. Eine ethnologische Studie*, Berlin 1995. More recently, see G. Jonker, "Die

31 Several authors could be listed here, G. Kepel being maybe at that time the most innovative paragon of this trend. G. Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam: Naissance d'une religion en France*, Paris 1987.

32 Again, several names could be mentioned here, of which F. Frégosi, *La formation des cadres religieux musulmans en France: approches socio-juridiques*, Paris, L'Harmattan: 1998; O. Roy, "Naissance d'un islam européen," in: *Esprit*, Janvier 1998, p. 10–35; F. Khosrokhavar, *L'islam des jeunes*, op. cit., can be considered as representative.

France, working more in a descriptive perspective. The most complete publication on the subject is now more than ten years old.³⁶

The publication of Heitmeyer's *Verlockender Fundamentalismus* in 1997 appears as a breach in the previous balance. Hardly criticised by the scientific community, basically for methodological reasons and accusations of ambiguity of its purpose in particular as regards the eventual use of the results by politicians, Heitmeyer represents however the first attempt by a German social scientist to address the question of ethnicity in explicit connection with religious belongings. When W. Heitmeyer, referring to Beck's theoretical framework used several years ago in a study of violence among German extreme-rightists,³⁷ published his work on young German-Turks involved in extremist associations (nationalists on the one side and "islamists" on the other, meaning by that young Turks engaged in associative networks and militancy), he rapidly gained the attention of the media as "the" expert on the topic.³⁸ Monopolising the attention of public opinion, Heitmeyer has also been supported by some political agencies, including the *Bundesverfassungsschutz* (*id est* the interior secret services). The magnitude of Heitmeyer phenomenon can however not been dissociated from the political and scientific general indifference towards the field „Islam in Germany". Apart from regional financial support to local scientific studies on local Muslim communities, the political class appears less mobilised on the argument than its French counterpart. The lack of statistical studies at a

islamischen Gemeinden in Berlin zwischen Integration und Segregation," in: *Leviathan, Sonderheft zur Migration und Stadtentwicklung*, Opladen 1997, pp. 347-365.

36 K. Binswanger, F. Sipahioglu, *Türkisch-islamische Vereine als Faktor deutsch-türkischer Koexistenz*, München 1988.

37 By that time, commentators were already insisting on the political sensitiveness of the argument and the ability of Heitmeyer to play this card: "Sie, Herr Heitmeyer, haben z. B. schon Anfang der 80er Jahre vor einer drohenden rechtsradikalen Welle unter Jugendlichen gewarnt und diese Warnung auch an die Politik adressiert, ohne daß dies besonders ernstgenommen wurde." Gert Rickheit, "Bielefelder Universitätsgespräche und Vorträge," 1997: 4.

38 W. Heitmeyer, J. Müller, H. Schröder, *Verlockender Fundamentalismus. Türkische Jugendliche in Deutschland*, Frankfurt a.M. 1997. It is interesting to notice that at the same time occurs the publication in German of Huntington's *Clash of civilization*, the two authors being often invited or quoted together for TV-shows or conferences in universities.

federal level, counterbalanced by inequally distributed local and regional inputs,³⁹ prompted then a social reading rather than a sociological one.⁴⁰ For K. Bade, this scientific weakness reflects the absence of political motivation. As pointed out by A. Treibel and M. Bommers, migrations studies in Germany were indeed mainly characterised by a real dependence upon the general political context and the *Ausländerfrage*: research agendas were constructed as perfectly fitting into the different steps of the political agenda.⁴¹ As in France, it's after the mid-nineties basically that a new type of work comes to publication, taking on the empirical challenge the previous generation maybe neglected too much.

While comparing Germany to France, several points need to be brought to the fore. The first one concerns the similar challenge the social scientists had to face while producing knowledge on Islam settled on their territories. Religious observance, ideological use of Islam as a source of legitimacy for political power, political and social activism, the multiplicity of profiles within the Muslim leadership, highly educated or 'Ulama, all these elements imposed to move beyond an imagined monolithic political Islam and to study religious practices independantly from migration waves and from the countries of origin.⁴²

39 This absence of statistical datas is confirmed by the *Bundesverfassungsschutz* (1995 Report). We still refer concerning the number of Muslims in Germany to the census made in 1987. Some regions provide more recent and actualised datas (*Statistisches Jahrbuch*). See also the remarks on this subject in P. Heine, *Halbmond über deutschen Dächern. Muslimisches Leben in unserem Land*, München 1997.

40 Among the best informants on Muslims, we find Catholics and Protestants associations, trade-unions reports.

41 See M. Bommers, "Die Beobachtung von Kultur. Die Festschreibung von Ethnizität in der bundesdeutschen Migrationsforschung mit qualitativen Methoden," in: *Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte* 1994, Opladen 1996, pp. 205-226 ; A. Treibel, *Engagement und Distanzierung in der westdeutschen Ausländerforschung. Eine Untersuchung ihrer soziologischen Beiträge*, Stuttgart 1988, and "Current Debates on Integration and De-Integration in Germany," in: R. Münz, W. Seifert (eds.), *Inclusion or Exclusion of Immigrants: Europe and the U.S. at the Crossroads*, Berlin 1999, pp. 56-59.

42 "The widespread reassertion of Islam in the politics and society of many Muslim countries has challenged and discredited the Western, secular bias of their governments as well as many presuppositions of modernization and development theory." J. L. Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform*, London 1997, p. 9 and 61.

It seems also that favouring a qualitative approach and to de-centre the point of view, considering the category of the subject, the personhood, the actor, more than the issue and interests linked to institutions such as citizenship and nationality, is dominating the literature in both countries. Anyhow, with a decade of delay in Germany—partly related to the non-relevance of the question on political agenda—the production of knowledge seems in both countries intimately related to the political representation of Islam as object of public policy. Here occurs the meeting of the over-investment made by political scientists in this field, and the need expressed by the politics to get information on the subject, sometimes to feed a technological discourse of the threat.⁴³ Last but not least, the renewal of the tools and methodological approaches to the subject, occurring simultaneously in France and Germany, can be observed in the various edited volumes on Islam in Europe to which authors from both contexts collaborated.⁴⁴

A non-neutral problematic: between normativity and values or the ties that bind academics and politics

A principal focus of contentious debates about immigration and its associated issues centres on religion in Europe albeit differently according to the host-country. Academic discussions on the presence of Islam as a second or third religion on the national level varies considerably, depending on the presence or lack of a political demand, the discipline and background of the individuals concerned who are mainly orientalist, ethnologists, anthropologists in Germany and former officers from

⁴³ See on this topic, "Construire l'ennemi intérieur," *Cultures et Conflits*, 2001, 43.

⁴⁴ See the growing quantity of edited volumes trying to connect national monographies under the umbrella of the label "European Islams". T. Gerholm, I. G. Lithman (eds.), *The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe*, London 1988; G. Nonneman, T. Niblock, B. Szajkowski (eds.), *Muslim Communities in the New Europe*, Ithaca 1996; S. Vertovec, C. Peach (eds.), *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community*, Basingstoke 1997; P. S. van Koningsveld, W. A. R. Shadid (eds.), *The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe*, Kampen, Kok Pharos: 1991 and *Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in non-Muslim States*, Kampen 1996.

the colonial administration, orientalist, islamologists and political scientists in France.⁴⁵ Many factors interfere and help explaining these ties linking academic and partial discourses on Islam. The main reason is a financial one: a clear political demand and a corresponding financial support facilitated the first studies conducted in this area in France mainly during the eighties. This presents certain obvious advantages, such as substantial help for quantification of the Muslim population. In Germany, it is only since 1997 that the federal government decided to provide financial support for a national statistical survey of Muslims settled in the country to be done by a department of Hamburg University, asking a Middle-East specialist reconverted into a "specialist of Islam in Germany" to set it up. This is another important aspect of the dilemma. In France too, the studies on Islam in Europe until the mid-1980's were made by former colonial administrators or specialists of the Middle East. Jacques Berque, former colonial administrator, became then the special advisor of J. P. Chevènement for "Islam in France" affairs during the first Mitterrand government. Indeed, as far as Islam is concerned, the legitimacy of the expert position as "counsellor of the Prince" has been often linked to his/her ability to bind domestic and international agendas. In this context, the impact of international crisis such as the Iranian Revolution or the civil war in Algeria play a central role in constructing the representation of Islam and Muslims inside European societies. From 1995 onwards (from the attack against the French Airbus in January to the Turkish elections and the victory of the *Refah* in December), Klaus Kinkel and the Foreign Affairs Ministry express officially the risk linked to the presence of Algerian activists collaborating with Turkish associations settled on the German territory, giving then the opportunity to experts of Middle-East studies to restore their position in the media.

The perception of transplanted Islam in France is traditionally almost exclusively constructed as regards to what is happening in the Islamic societies of origin countries, engendering major ignorance of trends

⁴⁵ To be completed by an analysis of the positioning of the authors as well as their impact on the setting of the political agenda.

specific to European context, for instance neglecting the more and more central dimension of Europe in the production of Islamic knowledge and religious authorities. The epistemic communities—i. e. the specialists of Middle Eastern studies converted into specialists of Islamic societies and, by proxy, of Muslims living in Europe—are then in charge of elucidating the cause-and-effect relationships. Another phenomenon touches upon the change of territory for fieldwork from Middle-eastern societies to European ones. After 1995, specialists of Iran have for instance demonstrated a particular interest in publishing on Islam among second and third generation of migrants in France.⁴⁶

The study of Islam among migrants needs to link local issues with broader frameworks, recognising the complementarity of macro and micro perspective, so far as Islam has an internal and an external base and is transnationally omnipresent. As social fact, it does not only belong to a set of domestic political issues but can also be considered as an international challenge, or even as an external “threat”—responsible for the “faultlines” between the civilisations⁴⁷—and sometimes an internal one. There is, thus, a relatively evident relationship between academics and politics following the transmission of the representations of Islam in the study of migration and international relations. These ties are reinforced by the idea that the *‘Umma* (community of Muslims) is independent of consanguinity and location and that solidarity crosses borders. Maybe connected to this, the scientific reading of the Muslim identities and socialisation gives mainly a communitarian interpretation that for a long time dominated social sciences on Islam in Europe. As far as Germany is concerned, A. Caglar mentions for example the “holistic conception” of culture and develops the idea that there cannot be negotiation, hybridisation and accumulation of different set of references as far as Islam is involved. Nevertheless, to be a Muslim does not mean the denial of other belongings. To this extent, the monomaniac

46 O. Roy, “Naissance d’un islam européen,” in: *Esprit*, Janvier, 1998, pp. 10-35; O. Roy, *Vers un Islam européen*, Paris, Ed. Esprit: 1999; F. Khosrokhavar, *L’islam des jeunes*, op. cit.

47 S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York 1996.

focus on integration, assimilation, or categorisation/ethnicity lets spatial and social mobility slip from the frame of reference within European societies. “In fact, settlement scholars love this process and earn a living from studying the subject. Often, however, they stress that immigration—regrettably—leads to problems”.⁴⁸ Ethnic businesses, today regularly flattered by the German media, were for a long time seen as the irremediable sign of “ghettoisation,” and not as a possibility to ascend the social ladder. Still *à propos* Germany, A. Caglar shed light on the use of the notion of “ghetto” as dominant organising idiom of the politics of the “foreigners problem” in Germany as well as major trope of immigration research.⁴⁹ Moreover, again following Caglar’s views, cultural enclaves play a major role in the internal organisation of the discourse concerning immigration, as result of a cultural fundamentalism in which Islam appears to be the guarantee of the distance between Germans and Turks. In this respect, not only German scholars but also research institutions such as the *Zentrum für Türkeistudien* in Essen, directed by Faruk Sen, produce a positive discourse towards Turks renouncing to their cultural specificities and therefore coping with “integration standards”.

The rebound effect of this scientific trend to link Islam in and out has been translated into an administrative empowerment of specialised knowledge groups being the constitution of epistemic communities as internal lobbies such as in France for the Ministry of Defence the Direction des Affaires Stratégiques and Centre d’Analyse et de Prospective⁵⁰ by “occupying niches in advisory and regulatory bodies.”⁵¹ In Germany, as the practice of expertise has yet not been so institutionalised, such trends may not be as relevant as they are in the French case. Anyhow, the German situation offers several examples of “native expertise”—*id est* Turkish—on the topic Islam in Germany. A

48 J & L. Lucassen, *Migration, Migration History, History*, op. cit., p. 21.

49 A. Caglar, “Hyphenated Identities and The Limits of ‘Culture’,” in: T. Modood, P. Werbner (eds), *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community*, London 1997, pp. 169-185.

50 See O. Roy, 2001, op. cit.

51 P. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” in: *International Organization*, 1995, 46(1), pp.1-36: p. 30.

consequent part of the studies published on Islamic—especially Turkish—organisations has been written by Turks living in Germany, being journalist or social scientist, most of the time politically engaged and ideologically identifiable. In terms of methods and conceptual tools, this transplantation of Middle-East expertise on European territory gave birth to a set of analysis centred on political organisation, associative dimensions and transnational boundaries between home and host countries. The concentration of the topic Islam in Europe in the hands of political scientists and Middle-East specialists from the eighties onwards disconnected then the approach from a strict sociology of religion. Binary presentation of Islam, as fanatical or indifferent, moderate or extremist, as “tout ou rien” correspond in both cases with the over-interpretation denounced by P. Veyne, and does not give any indication of the complexity of attitudes towards Islam.⁵² This dichotomic discourse by social scientists is mainly the result of a misappreciation of daily-life, providing “false intensities”.⁵³

Changing the method of investigations is a recent change among analysts of European Islam, trying to avoid global and unifying representations of what is made of diversity.⁵⁴ The macro-perspective alone is insufficient but still prevalent while the necessity of combining macro and micro analysis should be emphasised as far as “à côté de la majorité ou grosse minorité de fidèles par conformisme, il en existe une autre, plus petite, mais plus caractérisée, car sa température est plus élevée”.⁵⁵ Multiple belongings are the basic features of the generational change among young Muslims settled in Europe. Considering both individuals and associations as sites for production of religious references puts the stress on the voluntary dimension of “neo-communautarisme”.⁵⁶ This remark underlines the necessity to distinguish, speaking of Islam

52 P. Veyne, “L’interprétation et l’interprète. A propos des choses de la religion,” in: *Enquête*, 1996, 3, pp. 245-272: p.248.

53 Ibid., p. 258.

54 J. Cesari, *Musulmans et Républicains*, op. cit.

55 P. Veyne, “L’interprétation et l’interprète,” p. 258.

56 Still, as the clientele changed (younger, differently socialised, being more in contact through school with the German environment), the associations adapted themselves to this new type of customers, mainly proposing sport clubs.

and more generally of religious identity in Europe as in the country of origin, between ascribed and prescribed identities, the one you cannot escape from (being a woman) and the one you can choose (wearing a veil).

The pillar of the legitimacy of such an approach is linked to the peculiar topic of religion and to its definition. This is not a reality that could be quantified or concretely observed. Religion is mainly spoken (“I am a Muslim”), lived (“I am respecting the five pillars of Islam”), claimed (“I was born as a Muslim”), and ideologically instrumentalised (“I am supporting the *Refah Partisi* because I feel the Turkish State spoiled the real Turkish-Islamic identity”). An operational definition of Islam is necessarily a very extensive one, institutionally limited by the official membership into one association. It shares some similarities with Geertz’s definition of religion as cultural system—“system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”⁵⁷—without being reduced to a simple communitarian code. Culture plays as a reference on both individual and collective levels, providing codes, symbols, repertoires and symbolic places that people live occasionally in. It also provides an ideological apparatus, practices and symbolic repertoire by which the individual/collective consciousness as part of a believer’s life is built, educated and controlled. Methodological precaution is an endemic difficulty deriving from the nature of the topic: faith is in fact exclusively a personal matter which links social issues, cultural matters, political stakes. To become engaged in religious associative activities means to assume that the world is divided between those who are for and those who are against it (classical definition of the religion as claiming the unique possession of Truth), that some of the actors have the ability to participate, to be sacrificed, to influence the others and to enter into a collective mobilisation for the interest of the religion. This tool permits not only to clarify elements of the story and

57 C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, New York 1973, p. 90.

multiple belongings of every individual, but also to give a major indication on the meaning actors give to their surroundings and to their interactions with German/French institutions, social arenas, and then to reconstruct the „décor” in which it took place (connections to agenda-setting processes). Religion is not more prescribed, but much more constructed by the actors as a permanent bargaining with their environment, constraints and needs. This variety of religious behaviours can be easily compared to a more general remark concerning the numerous identities, embedded in national histories, specific political cultures and relations to the State which characterise Islam more generally, as it is the case while examining the multiple configuration connecting religion and politics in Western Europe.

Analytical and conceptual tools: the European outlook?

Dealing with Islam in Europe in a contemporary setting is mainly dealing with the national history of the relationship between religion and politics in the various countries. Coupled with the „laic” pressure, it became for example difficult for French academics to express their view on Islam in France: how could it be possible to interpret the stigma of a religion without contributing to the growing of religious practices and fanaticism? In France, public opinion and public political debates became part of the arena wherein Islam was shaped.⁵⁸ For instance, the gap between political culture based on the French *laïcité*, its interpretation on a daily mode, and the legal setting which sustains it is particularly impressive. This was the point the Council of State had to focus on during the so-called “hijab affair,” i. e. explaining that external signs of religious affiliation should not be seen as contradicting the spirit and the letter of the Law and trying to reduce the reluctance which prompted consider systematically religious identification as an act of

58 This remark should not be restricted to Islam. French specialists of the study of religion recently published their views on this topic. See Y. Lambert, G. Michelat, A. Piette (eds.), *Le religieux des sociologues. Trajectoires personnelles et débats scientifiques*, op. cit.

aggression. Originally, the separation of State and Church in France was motivated by the wish to reduce the social and political forces of Catholic institutions in the public sphere. In Germany, the same process of secularisation is based on the formal and institutional equality of Protestants and Catholics in public affairs. In fact, just as the *Laïcité* as an institution guarantees the „purity” of the relationship between citizens and the Republic, in Germany the nationality control plays the same role, while religion is linked to this official partnership.

In the very specific case of Muslims, the convergence of analytical tools arise, embedded in a normative and culturalist approach which mainly asks about the compatibility of Islam with democracy (Islam is perceived as structurally anti-democratic).⁵⁹ It appears difficult to escape the normativity of works on the supposed anti-democratic feature of Islam because the politicisation of Islam remains a major issue on the political scene in some Middle East countries pursuing “policies that are not necessarily congenial to the West”.⁶⁰ Islam, Islamist movements in the Middle-East and, *by proxy*, Islam settled and developed in Europe are more and more taken for granted as being given to confuse *din* and *dawla*, religion and government in a univocal and universally diffused movement. Deriving from that, considering Muslims as a whole seems to be the first mistake, not only because they come from different origins and belong to various trends, but also because they are managing different types of belongings. In empirical terms, incredible progress has however been made concerning the knowledge on practices, rites, corpus and social locations of Muslims in France⁶¹ as in Germany,⁶² in

59 In a similar way, the studies on migration in Europe and more specifically those working on the state response to ethnic diversity and minority cultures can be divided between the analysis based on the use of the concepts of integration/assimilation, and those structured around the concept of cultural pluralism. See S. Poulter, “Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France,” in: *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, vol. 17, n. 1 (1997), pp. 43-74.

60 G. Fuller, „The United States and Islamic Fundamentalism,” in: *Pflegebedürftige Nachbarschaft: Islam und westliche Politik*, SWP, Ebenhausen: 1997, pp. 32-55.

61 N. Tietze, “La turcité allemande: les difficultés d’une nouvelle construction identitaire,” in: *Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, n°24 (1997), pp. 251-270; N. Tietze, “La croix, le foulard et l’identité allemande,” in: *Critique internationale*, 4 (2000), pp. 79-100; F. Khosrokhavar, *L’islam des jeunes*.

particular as social scientists were facing the generational changes inside the Muslim population in Western Europe.

Defined as an origin and a praxis (respect of the five pillars), Islam is not anymore something you inherit because you are son of Turkish, Sunni Muslim parents. This appears to be a major evolution all over Western Europe. As pointed out by Olivier Roy, there are new formulations of Islam arising from the definitive settlement in Europe.⁶³ For instance, the relationship to religious belonging and praxis is not directly inherited from the family but is transformed and reinvented by young generations. The “bricolage” of reference appears to be the key-word underpinning these new forms of dealing with religious belonging:⁶⁴ people produce their own ways of being a Muslim. Through this process of reinvention, religion is not more prescribed, but much more constructed by the actors as a permanent bargaining relatively autonomously. The German context gives a specific dynamic to this process, introducing new elements, underlining competition of interests, giving opportunities and offering resources to collective and individual actors. Beyond the inherited dimension, religious belonging also represents an ethic for life which mediates familial relations, acts as a guarantee (the young girl or boy involved in Islamic associations is supposed to be in a *halal* milieu). In this sense, it represents a re-interpretation of tradition based, on the one hand on an experience—it is about becoming a Muslim, it is not “reislamisation,” it is an “islamisation”—, and on the other hand as such it is based on real knowledge of the inheritance, ethics and codes. This change concerns mainly individuals and implies even the category of personhood, mixing choice, faith and duty, without feeling under “social” pressure in European societies. Then the associative framework maintains the collective reference such as the moral code and education needs, even if from a strictly theological point of view, there are no moves from the

62 G. Jonker, ‘Eine Wellenlänge zu Gott’: *Der Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren in Europa*, (forthcoming); W. Schiffauer, *Die Gottesmänner. Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland*, Frankfurt a.M. 2000.

63 O. Roy, “Naissance d’un islam européen”.

64 The notion of “bricolage” has been stressed firstly by Levi Strauss speaking of myths. C. Levi Strauss, *La pensée sauvage*, Paris 1962.

traditional corpus. Considering both individuals and associations as sites for production of religious references helps insisting on the voluntary dimension of this kind of “*neo-communautarisme*”. The “individualisation” of religious feeling and belonging is a common feature of the sociology of religion that is especially associated with secularisation theory. In this respect, as pointed out by Hobsbawm, the tradition being reinvented is also a clear feature of the generational effect. Many indicators confirm in fact that reinventing-process: the technicisation of the relationship between children and parents concerning some very specific aspects of religious practices, the various interpretations sense given to justify the veil, etc. Still, the references produced by associative networks provide a common basis for socialisation. The „Islamic milieu,” being associative or informal, means also social control but provides a kind of “halal social space” with focus on specific sites (school, sport-clubs, trade-unions).

The classical illustration used for describing this generational effect is the veil and the difference between the justifications given by the women, mothers or daughters for wearing it. This is becoming more and more a non-cohesive argument between mother and daughter, of technical interpretations against traditional ones.⁶⁵ The daughter teaches her mother how to wear it. Considering the Western political vision of Islam, women have always been an ideal field-work implying a so-called contradiction of values, reinforced by the idea that “feminism” and women’s independent action is the only specificity of Western societies with sometimes a pejorative connotation.⁶⁶ The universal dimension of the gender blueprint is at the core of this development as far as „it is women [...] who reproduce nations, biologically, culturally and symbolically.”⁶⁷ The universalistic dimension of women appears,

65 Traditions being here conceived as the representations, the images, practices and attitudes a group recognise as necessary to its own perpetuation and preservation.

66 K. Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, London 1986.

67 N. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, London 1997, p. 2. Gender has to be understood as the way social roles of men and women are defined following a reference to their sexual distinction is considered. Ambivalence of the situation of women, de facto excluded of political visibility and participation while they are used to symbolise the honour of a country.

following their position in political regime, as indicator of the modernity of a political project in the perspective of a new regime, for Islam as for post-industrial Western European democracies. The image of woman is then commonly constructed as the climax of anti-modernity, archaïsism, pressure of traditions, backwardness, and is then overinvested in Western societies as a tool for denouncing the irreducible incompatibility of values between Islam and Western democracies.⁶⁸ Facing this primary attitude of stigmatisation, a new trend of studies can be observed among Western scholars as well as among local "native" ones. „On the practical level this is manifested by an apologetic attitude vis-à-vis Islamic fundamentalism" as a sort of new orientalism attempting to reconstruct new images of the East.⁶⁹

The theoretical aspect of it is maybe more complex to evaluate. Located between orientalism, political demands and the recent developments in the sociology of religion, two basic interrogations remain unchanged: Firstly, how far does the specificity of Muslims go, and secondly is Islam compatible with ideal-type of secular State? It seems that particular kinds of answers have been provided for this kind of questions following on the one hand the Republican mirage in France, and on the other hand based, in Germany, on the ethnicisation of the Other. Exactly as „integration" and political rights for participation have appeared to be the keys for understanding the position of migrants in Europe,⁷⁰ studies of Islam concentrated for a long time on the institutionalisation of religion more than they did on daily and individual interpretations of religious belongings. Together with secularisation, institutionalisation appears to be the common European scope through which the presence and permanence of Islam in Europe should be envisaged and managed. The attempt by the Ministry of Interior, Pierre Joxe, to set up a *Conseil des Organisations Islamiques de France*

68 B. Barber, *Jihad versus McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World*, New York 1996.

69 M. Abaza, G. Stauth, "Occidental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic fundamentalism: a critique," in: *International Sociology*, vol. 3 (4) (1998), pp. 345, 357.

70 M. Bommes, "Die Beobachtung von Kultur. Die Festschreibung von Ethnizität in der bundesdeutschen Migrationsforschung mit qualitativen Methoden," in: *Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte* 1994, Opladen 1996, pp. 205-226.

followed this guideline, such as the more recent *Consultation sur l'islam de France* launched by J-P. Chevènement in september 2000. If the institutional aspect is of particular importance, it only refers to the judicial way a State deals with religious dimensions, far away from the various dimensions religion can be settled in. Studying Christianity and Judaism, the sociology of religion expresses at several levels this diversification and multiplicity of what means today willing to be identified as a believer. As a matter of fact, the bifurcation of both dimensions, institutional and individual (we could add between cultural and political Islam⁷¹) is today becoming a reality of Islam in Europe, to a certain extent comparable to the distinction made by Grace Davie between „believing" and „belonging" in the case of religious practices in Great Britain.⁷² As regards to this evolution, the institutionalisation of Islam still has to be defined, either as the process of representation of the interests of a diversified and heterogeneous population, or as political project of controlling a "community of believers". Three elements need to be taken into consideration here: first, the difficulty for the sociology of religion to envisage religion as a non-stable and static element, as a matter and an object of change;⁷³ second the ineluctability of the sociological dogma of secularisation; third the importance of the "individual choice" dimension as far as faith is concerned. The ongoing secularisation process taking place in Europe concerns every monotheism, the deficit in frequentation of churches, mosques, synagogues being the most well known external sign of this change. It can however not be reduced to a simple process of emancipation of politics from religious influence, but implies also the recomposition of religious representations. This goes together with other processes such as privatisation (individuation, subjectivation) and pluralisation.

Exactly as there is a quasi-obligation of putting any reflexion on migration under the scope of nation state, there is obviously a western

71 N. Göle, *Musulmanes et Modernes*, Paris 1993.

72 G. Davie, "An Ordinary God: The Paradox of Religion in Contemporary Britain," in *British Journal of Sociology*, 41 (3), sept. 1990, pp. 395-420 and from the same author *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*, Oxford 1994.

73 J. Beckford, T. Luckmann (eds), *The Changing Face of Religion*, London 1990.

European definition of religion aiming at mastering other religions. Secularisation describes a process that can be traced in the course of social development associated with a loss of functionality of religion in the process of the structural differentiation of society. The paradigm of secularisation became then part of the “west European dogmatic spaces,”⁷⁴ and is assumed to be one of the “Référence fondatrice or Référence absolue”⁷⁵ as a concept of *logique* used to analyse the principles of legitimacy of the institutional system.⁷⁶ The distinction between the religious and the secular should be seen as an effect of the structure, not as its principle. In a sense, religion has been put out of the religious field with the help of the politics. Secularisation should then not be reduced to strict institutional aspects as a result of Wilson’s influence. In fact, secularisation concerns three aspects: the social (*laïcité*), the organisational (religious change), and the individual (change in the religious engagement, “deconfessionalisation”). Secularisation corresponds to a functional differentiation of religion from other social institutions relative along the European countries, which does not interfere with the ability of some religious mobilisations to reframe private issues in term of their public significance. Secularisation can also be seen as the end of the monopolistic position of Christianity on the „religious market”.⁷⁷ Here we can make a the connection with Muslims in Europe who, following Berger’s analysis, do not see religion as a constraint, but rather as a personal choice, in the line of the definition of secularisation by Luhmann as “die gesellschaftsstrukturelle

74 P. Legendre, *Leçons. 7, Le désir politique de Dieu: étude sur les montages de l’Etat et du droit*, Paris 1988.

75 “[...] il ne peut y avoir de système institutionnel qui ne fonctionne au nom de. Pour obtenir cet au nom de, des montages complexes agencent, par des moyens, si j’ose dire, basement mythologiques, la représentation, la mettent en oeuvre et lui permettent de produire ses effets subjectifs et sociaux. Selon mon jargon [...] ce travail de représentation met en scène la Référence fondatrice, ou Référence absolue.” P. Legendre, *ibid.*, p. 20.

76 P. Legendre, *ibid.*: 391. Legendre goes even further mentioning the idea of secularisation as an “occidental weapon” for expansion in order to master other normative systems (such as the Islamic one).

77 P. L. Berger, J. Sacks, D. Martin (eds), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, Washington, D.C., Ethics and Public Policy Center, Grand Rapids (Mich.) 1999.

Relevanz der Privatisierung religiösen Entscheidens”.⁷⁸ In this respect, secularisation should not be perceived as a diminution of the social significance of religious belonging, but rather as a change. Furthermore, this change of position and significance of religion on modern society is not homogeneous in Europe even if the invariable conclusion about the “integration of Islam in Europe” always leads to the same final question—who will be the leaders of the Muslim community?—, and inevitably to the same answer—as religion without institution and clergy (at least in the sunni version of it) Islam cannot give birth to a unique leader. Germany is a kind of model of reference in the deal between politics and religion concluded in 1555 and reinforced in 1648 on the basis of „*cujus regio, ejus religio*” which meant a territorial solution to the dilemma of religious identity. The result was a strict repartition in politics between Protestants and Catholics, and the model for it remains the city of Augsburg. In France, the solution to diversity has been put in a different manner through citizenship and the submission to the same State in spite of religious differences.⁷⁹ Basically, the political regulation of religion differs from Germany—where it is more driven as a partnership—to France where the separation of Church and State is strictly established (1905, Loi Combes). Cults are then organised differently, referring to two different ideas of Nation and State.

I see at this juncture two main difficulties that can be considered as interacting with each other. The first one is directly linked to the definition of religion as universalism. As Bayard says, “Islam in itself does not have any natural and unequivocal relationship with democracy,”⁸⁰ which is also the case for any kind of religion defined as “le phénomène de la conquête du monde par des interprètes”.⁸¹ The second one relates to the secularisation paradigm, and especially the duty to

78 N. Luhmann, *Funktion der Religion*, Frankfurt 1982, p. 232.

79 O. Christin, *La paix de religion: l’autonomisation de la raison politique au 16e siècle*, Paris 1997.

80 J.-F. Bayart, “Republican trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A toquevillian reading,” in: G. Salame, *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, London 1995, pp. 282-299: p. 298.

81 P. Legendre, *op. cit.*: 393.

find ways of institutionalising Islam, that dominates the reflection on Muslims in Europe. This does not mean forgetting the secularisation blueprint but using part of its causes and consequences on a sociological level in order to “dedramatise” the approach of Islam in terms of religious practices. The paradigm of secularisation should not anymore be considered as a given pattern of relationship between religion and politics, but as a constructed social product of a very peculiar context. Moreover, the historical construction of a political solution to religious conflicts offered by the German and the French contexts is questioned, in the sense that the juridical and public recognition of Islam in both countries touches upon sensitive issues such as religious freedom, secularism but also questions the centrality of the rights of the individual “as the paradigmatic solution to the problem of religious difference and diversity.”⁸² Invariably, the European states tentative to find avenues for institutional dialogue is always confronted to the absence of a unique hierarchical structure which is differently present in other religious groups. The challenge to church-state arrangements is however not following the same path in France and in Germany.

Conclusion

The way in which the West produces and structures its knowledge of the East is regularly at the core of debates inside the various disciplines of the social sciences. In way associated with this polemic trend, the peculiarity of the topic “Islam in Europe” is maybe more accurate as it refers to the specific tie binding the academic production with the politics, being through the involvement of experts in international institutions as experts (cf. le Tribunal Pénal International) or in national committee aiming at producing reflections integrated into the policy-making. Comparing two national contexts such as France and Germany underline the influence of the politics on a scientific discourse which

hardly escape either the recycling as “justification” for a political argument or decision, or the dependance from a sponsor requiring a specific study conducting following determined framing. As a matter of fact, the social scientists discourses can not been isolated from their ability to participate into the politics on the basis of their expertise. Moreover, their writings play a central function in the framing of the moral and political discussion of salient arguments (for instance the veils at school, the right to religious education, taxe raising, etc.) largely regulated by a legal argumentation.

The tensions arising from the interactions between these producers of discourses, being scholars, journalists, politicians or experts, influence the balance in the study of representation, that is to say in the absence or the persistence of some representations of a specific topic.⁸³ Then a reflection dealing with the conditions of production of a knowledge of the other directly does not only question the Weltanschauung of the so-called experts, but moreover the position and role of knowledge in the setting of a political decision. The power of knowledge is not limited to this active implication of experts in the decision-making process, but lies also in the way the scientific literature gives or not the access to certain types of information, and the way it gives birth to specific discursive practices eventually becoming sources of legitimacy. In fact, whereas, traditionally, the misunderstanding between policy-makers and scientific experts derives from the difference in the nature of their respective discourses (abstract versus pragmatic), from the different time-frames they are working with (mid to long-term versus short-term considerations), in the case of specialists of Islam in both countries, their empirical knowledge of the social reality they study puts them in a unique situation, both in terms of ability to inform politics, and in terms of placing certain issues on the public agenda. Our comparison of German and French literature indicates then a common “path dependence” vis-à-vis the politics and its needs. On both side, the experts of Islam in the two countries are in a position of delimiting the range of

82 K. Pratt Ewing, “Legislating Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the Relationship between ‘Church’ and ‘State’ in Germany and France,” *Daedalus* (2000), p. 33.

83 J. Goody, *Representations and contradictions: ambivalence towards images, theatre, fiction, relics and sexuality*, Oxford 1997.

policy options, have an impact on policy outcomes by submitting their advisory expertise to agencies of power which trust them. It is however clear that this cooperation with the politics remains, interestingly, still nationally determined even at the European level.⁸⁴ Such as the reaction to Said's *Orientalism* opposing defenders of authenticity and militants of right to difference, the field of experts of Islam in Europe seems to develop its theoretical framework into two political directions. The first one can be said to be „conservative,” in the sense that it focuses on religious belongings in terms of challenges to the Nation-State and, eventually, gives birth to a political interpretation in terms of security. The second one takes the opposite road, underlining the sociological individual production of various manners to be a Muslim in Europe, insisting therefore on the differentiation of Islam in Europe and framing this discourse on hybridity of identities in a more general perspective on pluralism.—Waiting for a new *Orientalism*?

84 A recent study on *Islam in Europe: a State of the Art* launched by the ex- Cellule de Prospective in Brussels required that national questionnaires would be managed by a specialist of the same country.

KLAUS F. GEIGER

Islam—a Cultural and Political Resource for Immigrants in the Federal Republic of Germany?

The following contribution shares a perspective which was developed in German sociological migration research in the early 1980's and which is connected with the names of Friedrich Heckmann¹ and Georg Elwert.² Integration into the society of the immigration country was no longer analyzed primarily as acts of individuals but as processes in which the individual is seen as part of groups which show a varying quantity and quality of inner communication and institutionalisation. Whereas an individualistic and assimilationist outlook is in danger of regarding affiliation to immigration minorities and adherence to their common values primarily as an obstacle to integration, this perspective asks if and in what way they can help the individual immigrant (or descendent of immigrants) to cope with demands originating in the country of immigration. Therefore in the face of growing demands of Islamic organizations for recognition and a public debate which regards Islam and Islamic groups as endangering integration on the individual and collective level, I shall try to develop questions and theses that might help to examine whether and in what way membership in Islamic communities could be regarded as a resource for the immigrants and their families. (I shall not treat the equally interesting question whether and in what way the new presence of Islamic traditions could be considered as enriching German society as a whole.) This focus may help to

1 F. Heckmann, *Die Bundesrepublik: Ein Einwanderungsland? Zur Soziologie der Gastarbeiterbevölkerung als Einwandererminorität*, Stuttgart 1981.

2 G. Elwert, "Probleme der Ausländerintegration. Gesellschaftliche Integration durch Binnenintegration?," in: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 34 (1982), pp. 717-731.